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 Do Consumers Gamble to Convexify? 
 
Abstract 
The combination of credit constraints and indivisible consumption goods may induce some risk-
averse individuals to gamble to have a chance of crossing a purchasing threshold. This idea has been 
demonstrated theoretically, but not explored empirically. We test this idea by focusing on a key 
implication: income effects for individuals who choose to gamble are likely to be larger than for the 
general population. Using UK data on gambling wins, other windfalls and durable goods purchases, 
we show that winners display higher income effects than non-winners but only amongst those likely 
to be credit-constrained. This is consistent with credit-constrained, risk-averse agents gambling to 
convexify their budget set.  
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“On Friday September 4th 1994, the freezer belonging to Gloria and Steve Kanoy of 
Weere’s Cove suddenly and mysteriously broke down.  Distraught, the couple set off the 
next day in search of a new one.  Stopping for gas at Lake Raceway, 607 Main Avenue, they 
decided to buy a Lotto ticket…”  
Virginia Lottery winner awareness campaign, quoted in Clotfelter and Cook (1990) 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Why do risk-averse consumers sometimes gamble? One idea, first proposed by Ng (1965), 
is that discreteness in spending or in labor supply opportunities can induce local non-
concavities in the value functions of risk-averse agents. This generates local risk-loving 
behavior and makes it rational to gamble in order to have a chance of crossing the threshold 
required to finance a lumpy purchase. A similar idea was advocated by Chetty and Szeidl 
(2007) in the context of committed consumption: when individuals are close to the region 
of needing to change their commitments, it may be optimal to gamble in order to cross the 
threshold of making the change. Bailey et al (1980) argued that access to credit markets 
made such gambling irrational, but Hartley and Farrell (2002) showed theoretically that 
rational gambling might still occur where borrowing and lending rates differ, where capital 
market imperfections exist, or if individuals' time preference rates differ from interest 
rates.
1
  
 
The first contribution of this paper is to use a model to develop the idea that households 
might gamble to cross purchase thresholds. Our analysis shows that this mechanism implies 
that lottery players will have systematically different income effects from nonplayers. The 
second contribution is to provide empirical evidence that some individuals do appear to 
play the lottery as a strategy for purchasing discrete goods. We do not suggest that 
financing discrete purchases provides the only – or even the main – motivation for 
                                                 
1
 One natural question is why households do not use the stock market to increase their risk and to gamble 
because the expected return on the stock market is clearly high. The point is that the stock market does not 
offer a discrete jump in payoffs. We do not think it is worth pursuing the question of why low income 
households do not use the derivative markets to take risks. 
3 
gambling,
2
 but we show that it may be important for credit-constrained households.
3
 In 
particular, it may help to explain infrequent lottery purchases, which amount to nearly 40% 
of the total (Gambling Commission, 2014). 
 
There are several reasons why it is important to know whether, in practice, consumers 
gamble to convexify choice sets. First, there is broad interest in whether credit constraints 
and indivisibilities in consumption pose particular challenges for poorer households. If so, 
it is important to understand what strategies poor households use to overcome those 
challenges. For example, Mullainathan and Shafir (2009) discuss the role of lotteries in 
allowing poorer households to achieve “small to big transformations”.4  
 
Second non-convexities due to the discreteness of choices pose a major technical challenge 
to researchers trying to model those choices structurally with dynamic programming 
models. One way to overcome this problem has been to assume that individuals facing such 
non-convexities play wealth lotteries (Hansen, 1985; Rogerson, 1988; Lentz and Traneas, 
2004). It is interesting to know whether this is simply a technical convenience, or if it in 
fact captures the way that individuals behave when faced with non-convexities. 
 
Third, following Imbens et al. (2001), lotteries have been used to identify income effects 
across a wide range of spheres, including consumption and labor supply.
5
 As with all 
instrumental variable estimates that identify treatment effects among a sub-group, the 
external validity of these results is a crucial issue and many papers acknowledge that their 
estimated income effects are valid only for a subset of the population. However, if 
consumers gamble to convexify choice sets, then current gamblers are an endogenously 
selected group: consumers will be more likely to purchase lottery tickets when they have a 
                                                 
2
 For example, Tufano (2008) and Kearney et al (2011) have emphasized the entertainment aspect of prize-
linked savings products in explaining their potential attraction. 
3
 In the UK, this includes not only the National Lottery but also premium bonds, a government bond which   
4
 Related to this is the case of rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs) discussed by Besley et al 
(1993). These are a micro-finance initiative in which groups of individuals make regular contributions to a 
fund, the total amount of which is allocated to one member each cycle via a lottery. Handa and Kirton (1999) 
provide evidence from Jamaica that people use their allocation from the ROSCA to buy durable goods. 
5
 Other papers using lotteries to estimate income and wealth effects include: Lindahl (2005), Oswald and 
Gardner (2007), Apouey and Clarke (2015), Hankins and Hoekstra (2011), Kuhn et al. (2011) and Cesarini et 
al. (2013). 
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desire to “convexify” and so these households will respond more strongly to income shocks 
than a random household receiving the same shock. A particular concern for external 
validity is that the selection process is directly related to the outcome of interest 
(probability of a durable purchase or a discrete change in labor supply). This is analogous 
to randomization bias in randomized trials (Heckman and Smith, 1995) if patients decide 
whether to subject themselves to randomization on the basis of their need the treatment, or 
the anticipated benefit of treatment in their particular circumstances. 
 
To highlight the mechanisms at work and to motivate our empirical strategy, we first 
develop a simple model where consumers choose whether or not to play a lottery, and then 
after the outcome of the lottery is known, whether or not to buy an indivisible good. The 
only consumers who play the lottery are those who are close to the threshold of being able 
to buy the indivisible good. A lottery win then enables the purchase of the indivisible good. 
The strength of the incentive for gambling will be diminished if agents can borrow at 
reasonable rates, so that the path of non-durable consumption can be unaffected by the 
timing of indivisible purchases. The need to gamble to convexify is also diminished if there 
are many indivisible goods so that the indivisibility is less “lumpy”, or if there are 
uninsurable income shocks which provide some convexification. All this means that the 
importance of gambling to convexify is an empirical question. 
 
To look for evidence that consumers gamble to convexify we use data from the British 
Household Panel Survey and focus on purchases of consumer durables. Our empirical 
strategy is effectively a “difference-in-differences” design with household fixed effects, 
contrasting estimated within-household income effects for lottery windfalls with income 
effects for other windfalls (specifically inheritances) among households that are credit-
constrained and households that are not. We use unconstrained households to control for 
more general differences in responses by windfall type – including the degree to which 
alternative windfalls are anticipated, or psychological feelings attached to different sources 
of windfall. We also use data on financial expectations to examine directly whether 
inheritances are more anticipated than lottery wins. There is no evidence in these data that 
this is the case. 
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Our main result is that, among constrained households, purchases of consumer durable 
goods are much more responsive to a lottery win than to receipt of other windfall income: 
among the constrained, the income effect of a lottery win is five times greater than the 
income effect of a non-lottery windfall of the same size. By contrast, there is no difference 
in the estimated income effects of different windfalls for unconstrained households. We 
also show that there is no differential effect of different types of windfall for spending on (a 
limited set of) non-durable items among constrained households. As a further test, we 
examine the effects of non-lottery windfalls on individuals who can be inferred to have 
played the lottery but not had large winnings (“players”). For the subset of these individuals 
who are constrained, purchases of consumer durable goods are more responsive to non-
lottery windfall income than purchases by non-players. Our “small winnings test” implies 
that it is not the source of the money (lottery versus other windfall) that matters, but rather 
that lottery players are in different economic circumstances than non-players.  
 
These findings highlight the importance of characterizing consumption opportunity sets in 
understanding consumer choices under uncertainty. They suggest that introducing wealth 
lotteries in structural models of discrete choice is not just a technical fix, but captures a 
genuine aspect of consumer behavior. And these results question the external validity of 
lotteries as an instrument for estimating income effects. We consider this as a specific 
example of the more general case for using insights from economic theory to shed light on 
the nature of external validity concerns associated with instrumental variable estimates.   
 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we develop the theoretical 
framework that guides our analysis. In Section 3 we examine the implications of the model 
for the resulting income effects if lotteries are endogenously chosen. Section 4 describes 
our data and empirical framework. Section 5 presents our main results, and Section 6 
concludes. 
 
2. A Model of Gambling to Finance Indivisible Purchases 
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Our model is a one period model with two stages.
6
 At the start of the period (in the first 
stage), agents have cash on hand 1x . They first make a decision about whether or not to buy 
at most one lottery ticket:  0,1l , where the price of the lottery ticket is 1. They then 
discover whether or not they have won. The lottery ticket is actuarially fair:
7
 an agent 
holding a ticket wins 1 q with probability q , so that net winnings are  1 q q  with 
probability q and 1  with probability 1 q . Net winnings augment an agent’s cash-on-
hand. Thus, 2 1x x if a ticket is not purchased, but if a ticket is purchased, disposable cash-
on-hand will be  2 1 1x x q q    with probability q and 2 1 1x x   with probability1 q .  
 
After lottery winnings are revealed, individuals decide, in the second stage, how to allocate 
their spending between a divisible consumption good and an indivisible consumption good. 
Agents can buy at most one unit of the indivisible good ( 0,1d  ) at price p . In our 
empirical work, the indivisible goods will be consumer durables. Without borrowing or 
saving, consumption of the divisible good is just 2x dp . Individuals maximize utility, 
which depends on the consumption of divisible and indivisible goods: 
2 2( , ) ( )v x dp d u x dp d    ;  is a preference parameter. We assume that  ' 0u   , 
 '' 0u    and (0) ( )u u p  , where this last condition specifies that the individual will not 
buy the indivisible good if this implies 0 consumption of the divisible good. 
8
  
 
We solve this simple model by backward induction. Define 12 2 2( ) ( )
dV x u x p      and 
0
2 2 2( ) ( )
dV x u x  . The indivisible good is purchased if and only if 1 02 2 2 2( ) ( )
d dV x V x  ,   i.e. 
2 2( ) ( )u x p u x   .   
 
                                                 
6
 This means we can abstract from borrowing and saving. As discussed later, the ability to borrow and save is 
likely to reduce the need to gamble to convexify. We exploit this difference in our estimation procedure, but 
we abstract from this in our model to make the motive for gambling to convexify transparent. 
7
 We could introduce a penalty for gambling and make the gamble actuarially unfair, but this would simply 
act to offset the motive to gamble caused by the non-convexity.    
8
 The additive separability assumed here is not necessary. It is however necessary to restrict the degree of 
substitutability between durable and non-durable consumption. We assume expected utility, although an 
extension to a non-expected utility framework may broaden the regions where nonconvexities occur. 
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Result 1 (single-crossing): There is a unique *
2x  such that the indivisible good is purchased 
if and only if *2 2x x  . 
*
2x  
is implicitly defined by * *2 2( ) ( )u x p u x   .  
Proof:  Uniqueness follows from the fact that  
 
   0 12 2 2 2
2 2 2
2 2
'( ) '( )
d dV x V x
u x u x p x
x x
  
    
 
                         
(1)
 
which in turns follows from the concavity of  u  .  
 
This difference in the derivative of the conditional value functions implies that the 
unconditional value function is non-concave because the derivative changes discretely at 
the point where the two value functions cross. This is illustrated in Figure 1. The degree of 
non-concavity will depend on the price of the durable good, p, and on the utility value of 
the durable good, η.  
 
 
Turning to the first stage, in which the decision to gamble is taken, let 11 1( )
lV x be the value 
of purchasing the lottery ticket and 01 1( )
lV x  the value of not gambling. A lottery ticket is 
purchased if and only if 1 0
1 1 1 1( ) ( ) 0
l lE V x V x      . Note that: 
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0
1 1 1 1
*
1 1 2
*
1 1 2
( ) max[ ( ) ), ( ,0)] 
( )  if 
( ) if 
lV x u x p u x
u x p x x
u x x x


   
   
 

               (2)  
 
and  
 
    
   
1
1 1 1 1
1 1
( ) max 1 , ( 1 )
 + 1 max ( 1) , ( 1)
lE V x q u x p q q u x q q
q u x p u x


             
    
  
 
Result 2: Lottery tickets are not purchased outside the interval 
* *
2 2
1
, 1
q
x x
q
 
  
 
.  
Proof: See appendix.  
The intuition behind this result is straightforward. If *
1 2 1x x   
the agent purchases the 
indivisible good regardless of the outcome of the lottery. Thus only 12
dV   is relevant, and 
the concavity of 12
dV   (which is inherited from the concavity of  u  ) ensures that the agent 
does not gamble. If  *1 2 1x x q q    the agent does not purchase the indivisible good 
regardless of the outcome of the lottery. Thus only 02
dV   is relevant, and the concavity of 
0
2
dV   (which is inherited from the concavity of  u  ) ensures that the agent does not 
gamble. The bounds,  *2 1x q q   and 
*
2 1x   are illustrated in Figure 2. In other words, the 
maximum wealth range over which lottery purchases will occur is given by the size of the 
winnings.  
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Corollary 1: A lottery winner always purchases the indivisible good.  
Proof: Since lottery tickets are never bought if  *1 2 1x x q q   , a lottery winner (with 
net winnings  1 q q ) always has *2 2x x . 
Corollary 2: A lottery player that does not win does not purchase the indivisible good.  
Proof: Since lottery tickets are never bought if *1 2 1x x  , any unsuccessful lottery player 
(with net winnings 1 ) always has *2 2x x . 
Result 3: There exists a compact region, 1 1 1,x x x   ,  which contains
*
2x  
 *1 2 1x x x 
, in 
which the agent will purchase a lottery ticket.  
Proof: See appendix.  
 
From Result 2, we know that  * *2 1 1 21 1x q q x x x      . Within these bounds, the size 
of the region 1 1 1,x x x    depends on parameter values ( , q and the curvature of of  u  ). 
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Together, Corollaries 1 and 2, and Result 3 imply that the state space (of cash on hand) can 
be divided into three regions. A region 1 1x x  in which the agent does not buy a lottery 
ticket and does not buy the indivisible good; a region 
1 1 1x x x  in which the agent buys a 
lottery ticket and then buys a durable if and only if she wins the lottery; and a region 1 1x x  
in which the agent does not buy the lottery ticket but does buy the indivisible good.  This is 
shown in Figure 2.  
 
This simple model illustrates that lottery players are likely to be close to the margin of a 
discrete decision. The implications of this theory for observable data are discussed in the 
next section.  
 
3. Empirical Implications 
 
The model above assumes that a given person, at a given time, will react in the same way to 
an income windfall regardless of its source. However, because lotteries are played by 
particular consumers, at particular times, the average response to a lottery windfall may be 
very different to the average response to other windfalls. This suggests, first, that we can 
test the theory that consumers gamble to convexify by comparing responses to different 
kinds of windfalls. Second, research that uses lotteries to estimate income effects will not 
estimate a population average income effect. This section develops these implications and 
then we take them to data in the second half the paper.  
 
We contrast the endogenously chosen lottery with a random windfall. To be concrete, we 
imagine that a random fraction ( ) of the population has an elderly, spinster aunt, who 
with some probability, q, will die in the current period, leaving a windfall.  In this thought 
experiment we hold the fraction of individuals with an elderly aunt equal to the fraction of 
consumers who chose to play the lottery. The key point of the thought experiment is that, 
while individuals chose to buy a lottery ticket, they do not choose to have an aunt. We think 
11 
of the incidence and survival of aunts as random, so that the income effect from 
inheritances then approximates the population average income effect. 
 
In taking these implications to data, there are two sets of issues to consider. First, there is 
the structure of the data and in particular whether or not we can identify potential recipients 
(lottery ticket purchasers, or consumers with an aunt) in the data. The second set of issues 
revolves around whether observed inheritances might differ from a random windfall, and 
how we might deal with this in our empirical strategy. We take up the data structure issue 
first.   
 
3.1. Different Data Structures 
We consider two cases, corresponding to two different data structures. In the first case, 
which resembles most of the empirical studies using lottery windfalls, income effects are 
estimated by comparing recipients (lottery winners) and potential recipients (i.e. people 
who play the lottery, but lose). In the second case, which more closely resembles our data, 
the comparison is between recipients and non-recipients. For lotteries, the latter includes 
both losers and non-players; for inheritances, the latter includes those without an aunt as 
well as those whose aunt survives.  We show that in both cases the extra spending by 
lottery winners is a biased estimate of the population average income effect (the income 
effect arising from a random windfall) because of the desire to convexifiy among some 
individuals, some of the time. 
 
Comparing recipients and nonrecipients among potential recipients. 
First, consider the comparison between lottery winners and lottery losers. In the model 
developed above, an agent always buys the indivisible good if they are a lottery winner 
(Corollary 1). Thus in this model, in which lottery playing is a choice, the probability that a 
lottery winner purchases the indivisible good is one: 𝑃𝐶(𝑑 = 1|𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡) = 1. We use 
the superscript “c” to indicate that playing the lottery was a choice taken by the individual. 
This, and subsequent probabilities are summarized in Table 1.  
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Table 1: Probabilities of Purchase: Chosen Lotteries versus Random Inheritances 
 
 
Windfall recipient 
𝑷(𝒅 = 𝟏|𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒆𝒑𝒊𝒆𝒏𝒕) 
Potential recipient,   
but no windfall  
(losing ticket, surviving aunt) 
𝑷(𝒅 = 𝟏|𝒏𝒐𝒏𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒆𝒑𝒊𝒆𝒏𝒕, 𝒑𝒐𝒕𝒆𝒏𝒊𝒂𝒍)  
 
Non-recipient* 
(losing ticket or no ticket, 
surviving aunt or no aunt) 
𝑷(𝒅 = 𝟏|𝒏𝒐𝒏𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒆𝒑𝒊𝒆𝒏𝒕) 
 
Chosen 
Lottery  
1 0 
1 − 𝐹(?̅?1)
1 − 𝑞 𝜆
 
Random 
Inheritance 
*
2
1
1
q
F x
q
 
  
 
 *
2
1 ( 1)F x- +  
1 − 𝐹† 
Difference 
*
2
1
0
q
F x
q
 
  
 
 𝐹(𝑥2
∗ + 1) − 1 < 0 
 1
0
1
q F
q





† 
Approx Bias: (Diff in diff) 
 
0)1()
1
(1 *2
*
2 

 xF
q
q
xF  
 
 
 * * *2 2 2
1 1
1
1
q q
F x q F x F x
q q
q


      
          
     

  
† The probabilities of a non-recipient purchasing the durable good are approximations to the actual probabilities 
because the exact CDF’s are calculated at different points. Hence the probability of purchase by a non-recipient when 
the lottery is chosen is given by:      11 1 ,F x q  and the probability of purchase by a non-recipient with a 
random inheritance is given by:  
 
     * *2 2(1 ) 1 1 (1 ) 1
.
1
q F x F x
q
 

     

  
However, since 1x  lies between  *2 1x   and *2x , evaluating each CDF at the same value of *2x  is a reasonable 
approximation. 
 
In the case of the inheritance, the distribution of aunts is random and so the potential for 
receipt is random. This is unlike the distribution of lottery tickets which results from a 
choice. However, among those with aunts, the actual receipt of inheritance is random and 
this is like the randomness in winning the lottery. We assume that the expected value of an 
aunt is 0:
9
 when she is alive, there is a per-period cost of 1, analogous to the ticket price of 
the lottery; a probability q of an inheritance being received, analogous to the probability of 
                                                 
9
 This is just an innocuous normalization to aid the comparison with the lottery.  
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winning the lottery; and a windfall payout of an inheritance of 1 𝑞⁄ . Net of cost, recipients 
receive  1 q q  giving cash on hand of  2 1 1x x q q   . They will purchase the 
indivisible good  if  *1 2 1x x q q   . We use the superscript “R” to denote that the 
inheritance is a random windfall. Thus  
𝑃𝑅(𝑑 = 1|𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡) = 1 − 𝐹(𝑥2
∗ −
1 − 𝑞
𝑞
) 
 
This implies recipients (that is, winners) from the chosen lottery are more likely to purchase 
the indivisible good than recipients of the random inheritance (column 1 of Table 1):  
0
1
)|1()|1( *2 




 

q
q
xFrecipientdPrecipientdP RC        (3) 
The intuition behind this result is straightforward. In the case of the random inheritance, 
some recipients will come from below the lower threshold and will not have enough cash 
on hand to buy the divisible good even if they receive the windfall. This difference tends to 
zero as q  becomes increasingly small: if there is a windfall that is very large but with a 
very small probability of receipt, it is in the interest of everyone with cash-on-hand below 
*
2x  to gamble to convexify, and all recipients of a windfall will chose to buy the indivisible 
good.  
 
For those that chose to play, but lost, the probability that they purchase the indivisible good 
is zero: .0),|1(  potentialrecipnondPC   By comparison, among the those with aunts, 
and whose aunt survives, there are some consumers with cash on hand above the upper 
threshold  1*2 x .These consumers will have enough cash on hand to purchase the 
divisible good even though they do not receive an inheritance, i.e. 
 .11),|1( *2  xFpotentialrecipnondPR  The probability of purchase is therefore 
lower among losers of the chosen lottery (column 2 of Table 1):  
 
  011),|1(),|1( *2  xFpotentialrecipnondPpotentialrecipnondP RC        
(4) 
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Putting together the differences in purchase probabilities between recipients and the 
difference in purchase probabilities between potential recipients who do not receive, it is 
clear that the income effect in the case of the chosen lottery suffers from upward bias 
compared to income effect from the random inheritance. The latter is an unbiased estimate 
of the population average income effect. An expression for the bias is given in the final row 
of the second column of Table 1. The size of the bias becomes smaller as the range in 
which tickets are bought becomes larger.  
 
 
 
 
Comparing Recipients to all non-recipients.    
Non-recipients comprise, in the case of the lottery, both non-players and losers, and in the 
case of the random inheritance, both those without an aunt and those whose aunt survives.  
Starting with the chosen lottery, those who choose not to play are those with  1 1x x  or 
1 1x x  while losers are the fraction 1 q  of lottery players, all of whom have 1 1 1x x x  . 
Of these non-recipients, only agents with cash on hand 1 1x x  buy the indivisible good. 
Recall that   is the fraction of lottery players:    1 1F x F x   , where  F  is the 
cumulative distribution of cash on hand ( 1x ) in the population.  Thus 
 𝑃𝐶(𝑑 = 1|𝑛𝑜𝑛 − 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑝) =
1−𝐹(𝑥1)
1−𝑞𝜆 
(5) 
 
 
The effect of winning the lottery (relative to non-recipients) on the probability of 
indivisible good purchase is therefore the difference (row 1, columns 1 and 3 of Table 1): 
 𝑃𝐶(𝑑 = 1|𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑝) − 𝑃𝐶(𝑑 = 1|𝑛𝑜𝑛 − 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑝) = 1 −
1−𝐹(𝑥1)
1−𝑞𝜆 
=
𝐹(𝑥1)−𝑞𝜆 
1−𝑞𝜆 
(6)
 
 
With random inheritance those with an aunt that survives are fraction (1 )q  of the 
population, and they purchase the durable if *1 2 1x x  .  Those without an aunt are the 
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fraction (1 ) of the population, and they purchase the durable if *1 2x x . The overall 
fraction of the population that are non-recipients is, as with the lottery, 
(1 ) (1 ) 1q q       . Thus the fraction of non-recipients who purchase the durable is: 
𝑃𝑅(𝑑 = 1|𝑛𝑜𝑛 − 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑝) =
𝑃𝑅(𝑑 = 1, 𝑛𝑜𝑛 − 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑝)
𝑃𝑅(𝑛𝑜𝑛 − 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑝)
 
=
(1 − 𝑞)𝜆(1 − 𝐹(𝑥2
∗ + 1)) + (1 − 𝜆)((1 − 𝐹(𝑥2
∗))
1 − 𝑞𝜆
 
                  (7)  
This can be interpreted more easily if we approximate *2( 1)F x   by 
*
2( )F x : this is a good 
approximation if the cost of an aunt, 1, is small compared to cash-on-hand. The probability 
then becomes:  
𝑃𝑅(𝑑 = 1|𝑛𝑜𝑛 − 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑝) ≈
(1 − 𝐹(𝑥2
∗))(1 − 𝑞𝜆)
1 − 𝑞𝜆
= (1 − 𝐹(𝑥2
∗)) 
 
(8) 
 
The denominator is the fraction of the population who are not recipients. The first part of 
the numerator,  *21 F x , is the fraction of all individuals whose cash-on-hand means they 
would purchase the durable regardless of receipt. Some of these individuals will receive a 
random inheritance and so this fraction is multiplied by the fraction of the population that 
are not recipients. Given the approximation that the cost of an aunt is small, the probability 
of purchase for non-recipients of a random windfall is independent of the fraction of the 
population with an aunt. 
 
 
By contrast, with a chosen lottery, none of those individuals who would purchase 
regardless of the lottery outcome actually choose to buy lottery tickets. This means these 
“always purchasers” are all non-recipients, and the probability of purchasing the durable 
among non-recipients is given by equation (5).  
 
To aid interpretation of the difference between equation (5) and (8), approximate 1( )F x  by
*
2( )F x  (recall from Results 2 and 3 that 
* *
2 1 2 1x x x   ). This gives a difference in the 
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probability of purchase among non-recipients from the chosen lottery and random 
inheritance  of (column 3 of Table 1):  
𝑃𝐶(𝑑 = 1|𝑛𝑜𝑛 − 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑝) − 𝑃𝑅(𝑑 = 1|𝑛𝑜𝑛 − 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑝) ≈
𝜆𝑞(1 − 𝐹(𝑥2
∗))
1 − 𝑞𝜆 
≥ 0
 
(9)
 
Note that   enters this difference only through PC and not through PR. It is only the 
fraction of individuals who choose the lottery that matters and so we do not require the 
assumption that the fraction of aunts is equal to the fraction of lottery players.  
 
The probability of purchasing the durable among the non-recipients from the chosen lottery 
is higher. This arises from a subtle composition effect because the group of non-recipents 
comprises two sets of individuals: those who did not have a ticket and those that had a 
losing ticket. Some of those who were non-recipients by choice (i.e. chose not to have a 
ticket because they would have purchased the durable anyway) do receive a windfall in he 
case of random inheritances.  This then reduces the number of purchasers of the durable 
among those who were non-recipients. As q increases, this upward bias in the purchase rate 
of non-recipients (relative to a random inheritance) gets smaller.  By contrast, we showed 
above that the upward bias in the purchase rate of winners (relative to a random 
inheritance) is increasing in q. This means that the net bias in income effects gets larger as 
q increases.  
 
The can be illustrated by calculating numerically the size of the bias among recipients and 
among non-recipients in our simple model, at particular parameter values. We assume a 
log-normal distribution for cash-on-hand, log utility for consumption, and consider a high 
and low value for the utility of the durable ( ). Figure 3 shows the difference in the 
probability of purchase between the chosen lottery and random inheritance. For these 
parameters, estimates of the effect of a windfall on the purchase of the durable from 
lotteries will overestimate the effect of a random windfall except for very small values of q
.  
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This discussion has highlighted the differing income effects that arise from different sorts 
of windfall gain. In particular, the effect of a windfall on indivisible purchases is likely to 
be larger if the windfall arises from a lottery that the household has chosen to participate in 
because of gambling to convexify. However, the strength of this incentive will be 
diminished if capital markets are well functioning, and so agents can borrow or save, 
because this allows the path of non-durable consumption to be unaffected by the timing of 
windfalls (Bailey et al., 1980; Hartley and Farrell, 2002). The need to gamble to convexify 
is also diminished if there are multiple indivisible goods of different sizes so that the 
indivisibility is less “lumpy”, or if there are uninsurable income shocks which provide 
some convexification. This discussion highlights the large number of factors that affect the 
convexification decision and that would need to be specified for a realistically calibrated 
model. Instead of following this approach, we look directly for evidence of convexification 
in data on household choices. We now take up this empirical approach in greater detail, 
including how we deal with ways in which an inheritance may differ from random 
windfalls.  
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3.2. Empirical Framework 
 
We adopt a reduced form empirical approach directly motivated by our model. Our main 
empirical strategy is to estimate a difference-in-differences (DiD) in income effects. In 
particular, we compare the effect of lottery winnings on purchases of indivisible goods
10
 
with the effect of inheritances – a different kind of windfall - and we compare these 
differences in income effects between households who are likely to be credit-constrained 
and those who are not. The latter is because we only expect a demand for convexification 
among the constrained. Unconstrained lottery players must be doing so for reasons outside 
our model (entertainment, for example) and so we would not expect them to be grouped 
below the threshold of a discrete purchase.  
 
We estimate an empirical model along the following lines: 
 
𝑑𝑖𝑡 = (𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑖𝑡)𝐿𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑡 + (𝛽3 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑖𝑡)𝐼𝑛ℎ𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼
′𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡  
(10) 
 
where dit is a measure of durable purchases by household i at time t; Cit = 1 if the agent is 
constrained, and equals 0 otherwise; Lotit and Inhit are financial windfalls from lottery wins 
and inheritances, respectively; itX is a vector of other variables that might affect purchase 
of durables, including age, composition of household (couple, number of kids), home-
ownership status, presence of constraints, employment status, financial expectations and 
year dummies. The error term, itu , consists of a household-specific fixed effect and a 
random noise term, i.e. uit = ϕi + it. 
 
In the context of the model above, inheritances are intended to approximate a random 
windfall. The assumption is not that inheritances are random across the population, but that 
they are exogenous with respect to the distance between cash on hand ( 1x ) and the critical 
value (
*
2x ), conditional on controls (including age) and individual fixed effects. Note that 
                                                 
10
 The BHPS question actually asks about all gambling wins. In practice, 79% of all spending on gambling is 
on the UK National Lottery, according to the Expenditure and Food Survey. This is a general household 
survey that is unlikely to capture serious gamblers, but it is similar to the BHPS sample. “Lottery wins” is 
therefore a shorthand for all gambling wins.  
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the critical value will vary in the population and over time for a given individual according 
to tastes and needs.  
 
Previous empirical literature has shown that durables respond to unexpected windfalls (see 
Keeler and Abdel-Ghany, 1985), so we would expect 031   . The theoretical 
considerations developed in the previous section suggest that, among constrained 
households, selection into playing the lottery will lead to differential responses to a lottery 
win compared to other windfalls. Under the convexification hypothesis, we expect durable 
purchases to respond more strongly to a lottery win than to an inheritance among 
constrained households, i.e.    4321   , and hence 042   .   
 
To claim that consumers are gambling to convexify, we need to rule out alternative 
interpretations and we deal with this in a number of ways. First, we include household fixed 
effects to remove level differences: the time-invariant unobservable characteristics, such as 
risk or time preference that affect both lottery purchases and durable consumption. These 
characteristics include any permanent propensity or preference for durables that differs 
between inheritors and winners. The inclusion of household fixed effects means that we are 
comparing changes in durable purchases, and not levels, across subjects. Only a small 
fraction of our sample experienced both a lottery win and an inheritance and so 
identification is largely across rather than within subjects.
11
   
 
Second, our difference-in-differences strategy, comparing income effects across lottery 
wins and inheritances across constrained and unconstrained households, controls for 
general differences in income effects that affect both constrained and unconstrained 
households.  As noted above, we would not expect unconstrained households to use a 
lottery as a means of financing indivisible purchases when they have savings or are able to 
borrow, because of the relatively high cost of gambling.  
 
                                                 
11
 In the whole sample, 8% of households report receiving an inheritance and a lottery win, but we restrict our 
empirical work to a sample of inheritances and lottery wins within the range £100-£5000 where the fraction 
falls to 2%.  
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Differences between the two types of windfall may include the possibility that inheritances 
are anticipated, as discussed by Hurst and Lusardi (2004). As well as the DiD strategy, we 
present additional evidence showing that household financial expectations and consumption 
do not adjust in anticipation of an inheritance. This suggests that while individuals may 
know they have an elderly aunt, they do not know the timing and the amount of any 
inheritance.  
 
An alternative explanation of different income effects is that the source of the money may 
affect what people feel that they can spend the money on.  This idea was termed “emotional 
accounting” by Levav and McGraw (2009) and nicely summarized by Epley and Gneezy 
(2007) in the following way: “although all dollars are created equal, one may feel a pang of 
reluctance at spending grandma’s inheritance on a new sports car, but little reluctance 
spending casino earnings doing the same.”  
 
We implement an additional empirical test (which we call the “small winnings test”), the 
basis of which is the following: among the people who received an inheritance there are 
likely to be some who were gambling to convexify, but who lost the (endogenously-
chosen) gamble. We would expect these people to behave like the typical person winning 
the gamble rather than like the typical person receiving an inheritance. We exploit the fact 
that, while we do not observe people spending money on gambling, we do observe people 
who win small amounts (defined as less than £100). These amounts are not enough, 
typically, to finance consumer durables directly but they do allow us to identify people who 
have gambled. Thus we test whether the income effect of inheritances is larger for credit-
constrained individuals who we know were gambling because we observe that they had 
small winnings. If this is the case, then it makes it clear that it is who receives the windfall 
that matters, rather than the source of the money, and thus the explanation must be a 
selection story like the convexification hypothesis. 
 
The convexification hypothesis identifies a potential selection mechanism that operates on 
variables (the need for durables, cash on hand) that vary through time for a given individual 
as their economic circumstances change, and further that operates only for the credit-
constrained. By allowing for fixed effects in estimating income effects, and by double-
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differencing income effects (across the constrained and unconstrained, and across inheritors 
and lottery winners), we rule out any alternative selection mechanism which operates on 
time-invariant unobservables, and any mechanism which is not limited to the constrained. It 
is still possible (if improbable) that there is an alternative, time-varying selection 
mechanism that operates only on gamblers who are constrained.  We cannot conclusively 
eliminate this possibility, but we present additional strong evidence against there being 
such a selection mechanism in the form of a falsification test involving non-durable 
consumption.  
 
4. Data 
Our main analysis uses data taken from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) from 
1997 – 2006 since this contains information on both durable purchases and financial 
windfalls. Beginning in 1991, this survey has annually interviewed members of a 
representative sample of around 5,500 households. On-going representativeness of the non-
immigrant population is maintained by using a “following rule” – i.e. by following original 
sample members (adult and children members of households interviewed in the first wave) 
if they move out of the household or if their original household breaks up.
12
 We select 
single and two-adult households where the head is aged 20 – 70. Our analysis sample 
contains information on 6,147 households (29,859 observations).  
Consumer Durables 
We focus on durables that are largely unchanged over the period and that are genuinely 
“lumpy” to purchase new. This means we exclude, for example, VCRs which were 
becoming increasingly obsolete towards the end of the period, and microwaves and CD 
players where the typical expenditure is fairly low.  We include televisions, fridge/ freezers, 
washing machines, tumble driers, dishwashers and home computers. On average, 36% 
households had purchased at least one of these six durables over the previous year; 12% 
purchased two or more. This is a set of basic durables that most households seek to replace 
on a regular basis. 
 
                                                 
12
 The survey incorporated booster samples from Scotland and Wales in 1999 and Northern Ireland in 2001, 
but we restrict our sample to original sample members.  
22 
In principle, households could potentially smooth their spending on new durables. One 
possibility is renting, although this may be easier for some durables (televisions, for 
example) than for others (fridge-freezers).  Also, most rental companies have a minimum 
rental period of 12 or 18 months and require a credit check, so the option of renting may 
not be open to everyone.  Similarly, hire purchase (rent-to-own) companies also require a 
credit check and may charge high interest rates if the repayments are made over a long 
period. We think it is plausible that, compared to these alternatives, buying a lottery ticket 
may not be an unattractive option.13   
 
Credit Constraints 
The BHPS does not have a question that asks directly about access to credit; we define 
constrained households as those with no (income from) savings or investments. This is a 
broad definition by which around half of all household-year observations are defined as 
constrained.
14
 Note that, with this broad definition, our estimates are likely to under-
estimate the true convexification effect, compared to an approach where we could identify 
exactly which households face credit constraints. We also show results additionally 
excluding anyone with household income in the top two-third of the distribution. However, 
recent evidence from Kaplan et al (2014) indicates that even high income households with 
illiquid but not liquid assets may face a hand-to-mouth existence.  
 
Lottery wins and inheritances  
Since 1997, the BHPS has asked individuals whether they have received any of the 
following financial windfalls in the previous 12 months: a gambling win, an inheritance, a 
life insurance payment, a pension lump sum, a personal accident claim or a redundancy 
payment. Our comparison focuses on gambling wins (referred to here as lottery wins since 
                                                 
13
  There are rental outlets that specifically target those with poor credit histories which do not require a 
formal credit check, only five references.  The advertised APR is 30%, but additional insurance which 
consumers are “strongly advised” to take out typically increases the effective rate of interest to more than 
100% (Collard and Kempson, 2005). 
14
 Young and Waldron (2008) show that 16% of the UK population is credit-constrained, according to self-
reported constraints in the amount that they could borrow, including both perceived constraints that 
discouraged them from applying for credit, and actual constraints where the household was prevented from 
borrowing either by the unavailability of credit or its high price. This is similar to Jappelli (1990) for the US 
who found that c. 20% of US households are credit-constrained based on survey evidence that they have been 
refused credit, or put off applying for fear of refusal. This information is not available in the BHPS.  
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this is likely to be the case for most) and inheritances since the other windfalls may largely 
be anticipated (such as pension lump-sums), as we show below, and/or may be associated 
with events that directly affect the purchase of durables (such as redundancy payments).
15
  
 
In the sample as a whole, 21 per cent of households reported at least one Lottery winning, 
while 5 per cent reported an inheritance. However, the average amounts received in the two 
cases are very different. The mean (median) Lottery winning was £290 (£40) compared to 
£29,949 (£5,000) in the case of inheritances. This is not surprising given the structure of 
National Lottery payouts.
16
 However, this raises issues for our analysis; in particular, how 
to ensure that we pick up the response to a lottery win compared to inheritance and not 
responses to different sized windfalls. Landsberger (1966) and Keeler and Abdel-Ghany 
(1985), for example, show that the size of the windfall affects what people do with it, with 
smaller windfalls being more likely to be spent.  
 
Our approach is to focus on “medium-sized” windfalls of between £100 and £5,000.  
Anyone who receives a windfall of more than £5,000 in any wave is dropped from the 
analysis and in our initial analysis we ignore small (< £100) lottery wins and inheritances. 
In this range, 13% of households report ever receiving a lottery win, 8% report ever 
receiving an inheritance and 2% report receiving both. Focusing on medium wins seems 
appropriate given our interest in consumer durables: larger wins may be associated with 
more widespread lifestyle changes such as moving house, while smaller wins may not be 
enough to finance the purchase of the white goods we focus on.  Furthermore, restricting 
windfalls to this narrower range makes the average lottery win more comparable in size to 
the average inheritance. Within the range £100 - £5,000, lottery wins are still smaller on 
average than inheritances, as shown in Table 2, but the difference is much smaller.  In 
sensitivity analysis (details available on request), we found similar results with narrower 
ranges of £100 - £1000 and £1,001 - £5,000. 
  
                                                 
15
We exclude any inheritances that are linked to widow(er)hood, i.e. deaths within the household that may 
have an immediate effect on durable purchase.   
16
 The odds of winning £10 are 1:57, compared with odds of 1:1,031 to win around £100, 1:55,490 to win 
around £1,000, 1:2,330,636 to win around £100,000 and 1:13,983,817 to hit the jackpot. 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Unconstrained Constrained 
 All Winners Non-
winners 
Inheritors Non-
inheritors 
All Winners Non-
winners 
Inheritors Non-
inheritors 
Number of 
durables 
0.516 0.544 0.514 0.640 0.512 0.493 0.714 0.486 0.574 0.492 
Age 45.5 46.0 45.5 45.6 42.7 41.7 42.4 41.7 38.6 41.7 
Income £2,959 £3,142 £2,948 £3,200 £2,952 £2,063 £2,559 £2,046 £2,378 £2,059 
Degree 
(0/1) 
0.217 0.131 0.223 0.220 0.217 0.106 0.066 0.108 0.174 0.106 
Kids (0/1) 0.552 0.476 0.558 0.532 0.553 0.782 0.653 0.786 0.721 0.783 
Couple 
(0/1) 
0.762 0.859 0.756 0.821 0.760 0.599 0.738 0.594 0.705 0.598 
Mean 
windfall 
 £514  £1,984   £595  £1,875  
Median  
windfall 
 £224  £1,500   £250  £1,200  
N 13,757 802 12,955 363 13,394 16,129 497 15,632 190 15,939 
Notes to Table 2: Number of durables refers to purchases made over the past 12 months of televisions, fridge/ freezers, washing 
machines, tumbledriers, dishwashers and home computers). Age, degree are for head of household. Income is household net 
monthly income. Winners and inheritors refer to those who receive lottery winnings and inheritances in the range £100 - £5,000. 
Constrained refers to no income from savings/ dividends 
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Table 2 provides summary statistics for constrained and unconstrained households. Many 
unconstrained households receive windfalls from lottery wins, and indeed a higher 
proportion than among those who are constrained. In fact, the existence of lottery winners 
who are not constrained is necessary for the DiD strategy described above. This is not 
inconsistent with people gambling to convexify, but is a reminder that this is only one of 
several possible motives for gambling. The BHPS does not contain information on who has 
gambled and lost. To provide direct evidence on who gambles and how gambling varies 
with total expenditure, we use data from the 2007 UK Expenditure and Food Survey. 
Figure 4 shows that budget shares on gambling decline markedly with total expenditure, 
consistent with the need to gamble to convexify being concentrated among low income 
groups.  Figure 4 also shows that the fraction of households with positive gambling 
expenditure is around 40% across a wide range of incomes, again consistent with the idea 
of there being more than one motive for gambling.  
 
 
Returning to Table 2, within the range we focus on (£100 - £5,000) there is no statistically 
significant difference in average windfall size between those who are potentially 
constrained and those who are not. Also, there is no statistically significant difference in 
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household income between those who receive a medium-sized lottery win and those who 
receive a medium-sized inheritance.  This is reassuring for our difference-in-difference 
specification. By contrast, the first row of Table 2 shows that there are clear differences 
across groups in the raw numbers of how many durables are being purchased. While the 
average number of durables being purchased is about 0.5 for the unconstrained, this number 
rises to 0.7 for the constrained who have had a windfall due to a lottery win (but not for the 
constrained inheritors). The aim of the detailed empirical analysis below is to understand 
how much of this difference in the raw numbers is due to the economic circumstances of 
those who have chosen to gamble.  
 
5.  Empirical Results 
5.1.  Main Results 
 
Our main results, addressing the question “Do durable purchases respond differently to 
lottery wins than to inheritances?”, are shown in Table 3. We model the number of durables 
purchased during the previous twelve months as the dependent variable. Below we show 
that the results are very similar when the dependent variable is a binary indicator for 
whether or not the household purchased any durables. We include lottery wins and 
inheritances in amounts (in £’00s). Below, we show results for a binary indicator for 
whether or not the household inherited/ received lottery winnings. 
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Table 3: Main Regression Results.  
Dependent variable = Number of durables purchased in the last 12 months 
 
 (1) OLS (2) OLS (3) FE (4) FE 
β1 Lot(£’00) 0.012** 0.004 0.010** 0.003 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
β2 Lot(£’00)*C  0.017**  0.016** 
  (0.007)  (0.007) 
β3 Inh(£’00) 0.003** 0.003* 0.004** 0.004* 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
β4 Inh(£’00)*C  0.000  -0.000 
  (0.003)  (0.004) 
N 29,859 29,859 29,859 29,859 
R
2
 0.046 0.046 0.008 0.009 
β1 = β3 [p-value] [0.012] [0.632] [0.135] [0.814] 
(β1 + β2) = (β3 + β4)  [0.007]  [0.036] 
     
Notes to table: Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at the 
household level (6,147 households). ** denotes statistically significant at 
the 5% level; * at the 10% level. Lot and Inh refer to lottery winnings and 
inheritances in the range £100 - £5,000. C = constrained = no income from 
savings/ dividends. Other controls: Age of head of household and age 
squared; couple; indicators for number of children; home-owner; head of 
household is unemployed, retired, other non-work; financial expectations 
for next year, constrained; year dummies 
 
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 3 are estimated using OLS. The results in column (1) indicate 
a stronger propensity to consume durables out of lottery winnings than out of an 
inheritance. In Column (2) we interact the windfall variables with a dummy variable 
indicating whether the household is constrained. This corresponds to equation (11) above 
and implements our main DiD test. The results in column (2) show that the stronger 
response to lottery winnings than to inheritances is driven just by those who are 
constrained, in line with our model. Columns (3) and (4) include household fixed effects to 
control for time-invariant unobservable characteristics, including time- and risk preferences 
that may affect both durable purchases and lottery participation. Column (4) presents the 
DiD test including household fixed effects. This allows for fixed effects in estimating 
income effects and double-differences income effects (across the constrained and 
unconstrained, and across inheritors and lottery winners), ruling out any alternative 
selection mechanism which operates on time-invariant unobservables and is not limited to 
the constrained. Column (4) is our preferred specification.  
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We find no evidence for any general “lottery winnings effect” – there is no significant 
difference in the response to lottery and inheritances among unconstrained households. 
However, among the constrained, the marginal propensity to consume durables out of 
(endogenously-selected) lottery winnings is nearly five times stronger than that out of an 
(exogenously determined) inheritance. To give some indication of how big these responses 
are, consider a typical medium-sized lottery win or inheritance of £500. This would result 
in a 0.095 increase in the number of durables purchased within the year among constrained 
households, which is an increase of 19% over the baseline purchase rate of those who are 
neither winners nor inheritors (0.49 from Table 2). The corresponding numbers for a £500 
inheritance are a 0.020 increase in the number, which is a 4% increase over the baseline 
purchase rate. While this focuses on the constrained, they comprise nearly half of our 
sample. These numbers suggest that using lottery wins as an instrument is likely to do a 
poor job in estimating population average income effects.  
 
5.2. Alternative specifications 
Table 4 summarizes the results from a number of alternative specifications. To facilitate 
comparison, we include the results from our preferred specification (Table 3, column 4) in 
the first column of Table 4.  
First, we impose common support on our sample. A possible limitation of regression 
adjustment is that, except in the special case of discrete independent variables and a fully-
saturated model, it allows estimation of counterfactuals for treated units for whom there are 
no similar control units. To address this, we estimate propensity score models for the 
treatment group (constrained, lottery winners) versus each control group and impose 
common support in the probability, given characteristics, of being a constrained lottery 
winner (a propensity score). Given the similarity in characteristics among the groups (Table 
2), imposing common support results in dropping relatively few observations and the 
estimates, shown in Column (2) of Table 4 are very similar. 
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Table 4: Alternative specifications 
 (1) FE 
Main 
Results 
 
(2) FE 
common 
support 
(3) FE 
Discrete 
dependent 
variable  
(4) OLS 
Discrete 
windfall 
variable 
(5) FE 
Discrete 
windfall 
variable 
(6) FE 
Discrete + 
continuous 
windfall  
(7) FE 
Tighter 
definition of 
constrained 
β1 Lot(£’00) 0.003 0.003 0.003   0.004 0.007* 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.002)   (0.004) (0.004) 
β2 Lot(£’00)*C 0.016** 0.016** 0.005*   0.014 0.012 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.003)   (0.009) (0.008) 
β3 Inh(£’00) 0.004* 0.004* 0.004**   0.001 0.005** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)   (0.003) (0.002) 
β4 Inh(£’00)*C -0.000 -0.002 -0.002   0.009 -0.006 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.002)   (0.006) (0.005) 
β5 Lot(0/1)    0.031 0.008 -0.008  
    (0.029) (0.040) (0.047)  
β6 Lot(0/1)*C    0.183** 0.119* 0.032  
    (0.055) (0.066) (0.081)  
β7 Inh(0/1)    0.090** 0.118** 0.094  
    (0.044) (0.055) (0.087)  
β8 Inh(0/1)*C    -0.062 -0.108 -0.273*  
    (0.076) (0.103) (0.159)  
N 29,859 29,281 29859 29,859 29,859 29,859 29859 
R
2
 0.009 0.009 0.008 0.046 0.008 0.009 0.009 
β1 = β3 [p-value] [0.814] [0.770] [0.761]    [0.607] 
β5 = β7    [0.258] [0.106]   
(β1 + β2) = (β3 + β4) [0.036] [0.024] [0.035]    [0.014] 
(β5 + β6) = (β7 + β8)    [0.014] [0.242]   
(β5 + ?̅?β1) = (β7 + ?̅?β3),  ?̅? = £550 
(β5 + ?̅?β1) = (β7 + ?̅?β3),  ?̅? = £2000 
     [0.293] 
[0.553]  
 
((β5 + ?̅?β1) +(β6 + ?̅?β2)) = ((β7 + ?̅?β3)+(β8 + ?̅?β4),  ?̅? = £550  
((β5 + ?̅?β1) +(β6 + ?̅?β2)) = ((β7 + ?̅?β3)+(β8 + ?̅?β4),  ?̅? = £2000  
   [0.047] 
 [0.018] 
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Notes to Table 4: Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at the household level. ** denotes statistically significant at the 5% level; * at the 10% level. Lot and 
Inh refer to lottery winnings and inheritances in the range £100 - £5,000. C = constrained = no income from savings/ dividends, except specification (7) where C = 
constrained = no income from savings/ dividends and in the bottom third of the income distribution. Other controls: Age of head of household and age squared; 
couple; indicators for number of children; home-owner; head of household is unemployed, retired, other non-work; financial expectations for next year, 
constrained; year dummies. ).  In specification (3) the dependent variable is a discrete (0/1) measure of whether a durable was purchased during the previous 12 
months. The tests for specification (6) are evaluated at the mean of both lottery winnings (£550) and inheritances (£2000).
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Column (3) of Table 4 confirms that the results are also similar if we adopt a binary 
dependent variable and estimate the probability of durable purchase rather than the number 
of durables purchased.  
There may be a concern that the relationship may be mis-specified since our windfall 
variables include a large number of zeroes. If we include lottery wins and inheritances as 
binary indicators (and include household fixed effects), we find similar estimated responses 
to lottery winnings and inheritances among constrained households (Column (5)). 
However, one issue with this specification is that the typical lottery win is much smaller 
than the typical inheritance making the effects hard to compare directly. Column (6) 
presents a further specification that includes both a binary indicator and the amount of the 
windfall and p-values for the test that lotteries and inheritances have the same effect on 
durables purchased using the mean of the two types of windfalls (£550 and £2,000 
respectively). The finding is the same – we find a stronger effect of lottery winnings than 
inheritances on durable purchases, but only among the constrained.  
 
Finally, column (7) includes a tighter definition of constrained, including only those in the 
bottom third of the income distribution. The broader measure may well understate the 
importance of the bias induced by self-selection into lottery playing if the broader measure 
is treating some unconstrained individuals as constrained. Comparing column (7) with 
column (1), the difference between constrained lottery players and constrained inheritors is 
greater with the narrower definition of a constraint. 
 
.  
5.3. Are Inheritances Anticipated? 
As noted in the previous section, one potential concern is that inheritances may differ from 
lottery wins in being reasonably well anticipated by the individual.  Table 5 reports the 
results of a fixed effects regression of a binary indicator for whether the (head of the) 
household expects their financial situation to improve over the next 12 months on a set of 
indicators for whether or not the household does in fact receive a lottery win, an inheritance 
or one of the other financial windfalls (life insurance payment, pension lump sum, personal 
accident claim, redundancy payment) over the following 12 months, focusing on medium-
sized windfalls (between £100 - £5,000).  Only the coefficient on other windfalls is positive 
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and significant; our financial expectation data do not contain any evidence that medium 
inheritances are anticipated. Consistent with this, sensitivity analysis (details available on 
request) that included lead terms in the durables regression to pick up the effect of any 
anticipated windfalls found no significant anticipation effects.  
 
Table 5: Are Windfalls Expected? 
Fixed effects regression results.  
Dependent variable:  (0/1) whether household head expects financial situation to improve 
over the next 12 months 
 Whole sample Constrained Unconstrained 
Lot (0/1) t+1 
0.008 
(0.016) 
-0.009 
(0.028) 
0.012 
(0.020) 
Inh (0/1) t+1 
0.018 
(0.028) 
0.034 
(0.049) 
-0.019 
(0.037) 
Other (0/1) t+1 
0.035** 
(0.014) 
0.014 
(0.022) 
0.058** 
(0.019) 
N 27,410 14,508 12,884 
R
2
 0.001 0.000 0.001 
 
Notes to table: Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at the household level. ** denotes 
statistically significant at the 5% level; * at the 10% level. Lot and Inh refer to lottery winnings and 
inheritances in the range £100 - £5,000. “Other” refers to other windfalls and includes life insurance 
policy payments, pension lump-sums, redundancy payments, personal accident claims and “anything 
else”. Constrained = no income from savings/ dividends.  
 
 
5.4. The Small Winnings Test 
We also perform what we call the “small winnings” test, by estimating the following 
empirical model: 
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𝒅𝒊𝒕 = (𝜷𝟏 + 𝜷𝟐𝑪𝒊𝒕)𝑳𝒐𝒕𝒊𝒕 + (𝜷𝟑 + 𝜷𝟒𝑪𝒊𝒕)𝑰𝒏𝒉𝒊𝒕 + (𝜹𝟏 + 𝜹𝟐𝑪𝒊𝒕)𝑺𝒎𝑳𝒐𝒕𝒊𝒕 × 𝑰𝒏𝒉𝒊𝒕 + 𝜶
′𝑿𝒊𝒕 +
𝒖𝒊𝒕      (11) 
 
where SmLotit = 1 if someone receives a lottery win of less than £100, and equals 0 
otherwise.  Our hypothesis is that, among constrained households, those who receive a 
medium-sized inheritance and also a small lottery win will not behave like those who only 
received a medium-sized inheritance but rather will have the larger income responses of 
those who receive a medium-sized lottery win (i.e. (β1 + β2) = (β3 + β4) + (δ1 + δ2)) 
 
The results in Table 6 show that this is exactly what we find in our data. Column (1) 
reproduces (from Column (4) of Table 3) the results from our main DiD specification with 
household fixed effects. In Column (2) we report estimates of equation (12) in which we 
interact the inheritance variables with a dummy indicating a small lottery win. We find that 
constrained inheritors that we know to have been gambling exhibit much larger income 
effects than other inheritors. In fact, their responses are not statistically different from the 
responses of lottery winners. This test provides further confirmation that our findings in the 
previous section were not driven by differences in the way individuals respond to lottery 
winnings compared to inheritances.  Instead, it is the characteristics and situation of the 
person who receives the money that matters. Constrained gamblers have larger responses 
and this is consistent with the idea that they are a selected group: close to a purchase 
margin. 
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Table 6: Small Winnings Test 
 Main results Further test 
β1 Lot(£’00) .003 
(.004) 
.003 
(.003) 
β2 Lot(£’00)*C .016** 
(.007) 
.016** 
(.006) 
β3 Inh(£’00) .004* 
(.002) 
.004* 
(.002) 
β4 Inh(£’00)*C -.000 
(.004) 
-.004 
(.004) 
δ1 SmLot(0/1)*Inh(£’00)  -.000 
(.005) 
δ2 SmLot(0/1)*Inh(£’00)*C  .019 
(.013) 
β1 = β3 [p-value] [.814] [.780] 
(β1 + β2) = (β3 + β4) [.036] [.008] 
(β1 + β2) = ((β3 + β4) + (δ1 + δ2))  [.898] 
N 29,859 29,859 
R
2
 0.009 0.009 
Notes to table: Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at the household level (6147 households). ** 
denotes statistically significant at the 5% level; * at the 10% level. Lot and Inh refer to lottery winnings and 
inheritances in the range £100 - £5,000. C = constrained = no income from savings/ dividends; SmLot is an 
indicator if the household receives a lottery win of less than £100.  Regressions include full set of controls as 
in Table 3. 
 
 
5.5. Falsification Tests 
Finally, in Table 7 we present the results from running our main specification but with 
measures of non-durable spending. The BHPS contains only a small number of these 
measures – we include weekly household spending on food for home consumption or, 
separately, food out (in restaurants) on the left-hand side.
17
 Since these are both divisible 
goods, these results provide a falsification test of the convexification hypothesis.  
 
We find zero income effects for both lottery wins and inheritance receipts when we 
examine spending on food for home consumption. For meals out, we find a difference in 
                                                 
17
 In the BHPS, the food data are banded and we take the mid-points.  
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the propensity to spend out of lottery winnings and inheritances. People are more likely to 
spend money on a meal out when they win on the lottery than when they inherit, consistent 
with an emotional accounting story. Crucially, however, this difference is common to both 
constrained and unconstrained households – both types react to a moderate win on the 
lottery by celebrating with a meal out. On this evidence, our finding of a differential 
response to lottery wins and inheritances for the constrained and not for the unconstrained 
is true only for durable purchases, consistent with our model of gambling to convexify.  
Table 7: Falsification Tests 
 
 
Number of 
durables 
Food at home (£) Meals out (£) 
β1 Lot(£’00) .003 
(.004) 
-.045 
(.102) 
.846** 
(.307) 
β2 Lot(£’00)*C .016** 
(.0052) 
.195 
(.167) 
.349 
(.457) 
β3 Inh(£’00) .004* 
(.002) 
.047 
(.061) 
.169 
(.1136) 
β4 Inh(£’00)*C -.000 
(.004) 
-.009 
(.083) 
.381* 
(.217) 
β1 = β3 [p-value] [.814] [.440] [.045] 
(β1 + β2) = (β3 + β4) [.036] [.453] [.082] 
N 29,859 28,859 29,859 
R
2
 0.009 0.109 0.072 
Notes to table: Standard errors in brackets, clustered at the household level (6147 households). ** denotes 
statistically significant at the 5% level; * at the 10% level. Lot and Inh refer to lottery winnings and 
inheritances in the range £100 - £5,000. C = constrained = no income from savings/ dividends.  Other controls 
as in table 3. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Following an idea first proposed by Ng (1965) this paper shows that consumers are more 
likely to gamble when faced with a discrete decision and we illustrated how using windfalls 
from endogenously chosen lotteries could give rise to biased estimates of population 
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income effects. The key point is that the group of lottery players is determined by a time-
varying selection mechanism that is directly related to the outcome of interest.  
 
We have presented convincing empirical support for the hypothesis that consumers 
sometimes gamble to convexify their choice sets. The purchase of durables responds more 
strongly to a lottery win than to another windfall among constrained households. Our 
empirical strategy – difference-in-differences with household fixed effects – rules out any 
alternative explanation for this finding that involves time-invariant unobservable 
characteristics of lottery players and/or that applies to all lottery players (constrained and 
un-constrained). It is hard to think of another selection mechanism that can explain this 
result. Our small winnings test and falsification test using items of non-durable spending 
provide further support for our preferred explanation.  
 
Our findings are important for a number of reasons. They provide at least a part of the 
explanation for gambling among low-income households, and also for the popularity of 
prize-linked savings products amongst these households. Our finding complements the 
recent discussion by Mullainathan and Safhir (2009) that lotteries may play a role in the 
household finances of low-income households. Given the poor return to playing lotteries, 
our evidence that individuals are gambling to finance indivisible purchases highlights the 
lack of financing options available to poor households, and the severity of the financial 
constraints they face.  
 
Our findings demonstrate that assuming that individuals facing non-convex choice sets play 
wealth lotteries – as is often done in structural models with discrete choices – is not just a 
technical convenience. This modeling strategy captures an important aspect of how real 
individuals behave when faced with such non-convexities. 
 
Our findings also highlight issues with using lottery winnings to instrument for income. 
The random success of winning a gamble would seem to make it a natural instrument for 
unanticipated income changes and has motivated the widespread use of lotteries in 
identifying income effects. However giving consideration to theoretical reasons for why 
people gamble is crucial for understanding exactly what is being estimated in this case. Our 
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findings indicate that the degree of over-estimation is likely to be sizeable. Among 
constrained households, using lottery winnings leads to estimated income effects that are 
five times bigger than using other windfall income. Since the definition of constrained 
consists of half of all households in our sample, this suggests that using lottery wins as an 
instrument is likely to do a poor job in estimating population average income effects.  
 
We have defined constrained as those with no income from savings or investment. It is 
important to note that this might be a marker for perceived illiquidity rather than actual 
illiquidity: individuals with limited financial literacy may believe themselves to be 
constrained and so resort to inefficient financial instruments like lotteries. The policy 
implications of actual versus perceived illiquidity may differ: the former is an argument for 
making more instruments available, while the latter is about public awareness of existing 
instruments.   
 
Playing lotteries may be part of a larger set of strategies where risks are taken to overcome 
thresholds. The presence of payday lenders, pawn shops and evidence of weak financial 
institutions are often found in areas of high crime and highly variable outcomes.  
 
More generally, gambling data has been used to identify consumer preferences, beliefs on 
probabilities and wealth elasticities. A key example in the literature is the attempt to 
identify whether the under-purchase of short-odd gambles is due to risk loving preferences 
or due to probability misperception.
18
 Our analysis suggests that gambling is induced by a 
rational response to features of some individuals’ consumption opportunity sets. Analyses 
that ignore these features of the consumption opportunity set (such as non-convexities) will 
mischaracterize preferences for risk and evidence of probability misperception. In some 
circumstances, gambling by fully-informed, risk-averse individuals is rational behavior 
borne out of necessity. 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
18
Eg. Jullien and Salanie, (2005), Snowberg and Wolfers (2010), Gandhi and Serrano-Padial (2014)  
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Appendix: Proofs of Results 2 and 3 
Proof of Result 2 
Result 2: Lottery tickets are not purchased outside the interval  
* *
1 2 2
1
, 1
q
x x x
q
 
   
 
.  
Proof:  
The value functions for not buying a lottery ticket is given by: 
 
  *0 1 1 2
1 *
1 1 2
 if 
( )  if 
l u x x xV
u x p x x

 
 
    
The expected value function for buying a ticket is given by: 
 
 
*
1 1 2 *
1 1 1 2
1 *
1 1 2*
1 1 2
1 1
 if 
1  if 1
(1 )
( 1 ) ln  if 11 1
( )  if 
l
q q
u x x x
u x x xq q
E V q q
u x p x xq q
u x p x x
q q



   
                               
  
 
Now  consider separately the incentive to buy a lottery ticket when cash-on-hand is below 
the interval and above the interval.  
 
1) When  
  *1` 2 1 ,x x q q    
cash-on-hand in period 2 will be sufficiently low that even if the lottery is won, *2 2x x , 
and so the household does not buy the indivisible good, regardless of the lottery outcome. 
Thus, the expected value of buying a lottery ticket becomes: 
 11 1 1
1
 (1 ) 1l
q
E V qu x q u x
q
          
   
The value of not buying becomes:  01 1
lV u x  . Since the gamble is actuarially fair and 
utility, u, is concave, the value of not buying a lottery ticket is always greater than the 
expected value of buying the lottery ticket: 
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qu x q u x E V
q



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         
 
 
  
 
2) ) When  
 *1` 2 1,x x   
cash-on-hand in period 2 will be sufficiently high that even if the lottery is lost, *2 2x x , 
and so the household buys the indivisible good regardless of the lottery outcome. Thus, the 
expected value of buying a lottery ticket becomes: 
 11 1 1
1
 (1 ) 1l
q
E V qu x p q u x p
q

 
           
   
And the value of not buying becomes:  
  01 1
lV u x p      
Since the gamble is actuarially fair and utility, u, is concave, the value of not buying the 
lottery ticket is always greater than the value of buying the ticket. 
 
 
 
0
1 1
1
1 1 1
1
 (1 ) 1 ,
l
l
V u x p
q
qu x p q u x p E V
q




  
 
            
   
Proof of Result 3 
 
Result 3: There exists a region, 1 1 1,x x x   ,  which contains
*
2x  
 *1 2 1x x x 
, in which the 
agent will purchase a lottery ticket.  
 
Proof: 
We consider the incentive to buy a lottery ticket in the region of *2x .   Define the difference 
in utility from purchasing the indivisible good and not purchasing it as  
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   2 2u x p u x      
We consider separately the incentive ε above and ε below *2x . 
 
1) Below *2x : When 
*
2 2
0
x x
and so


 
  
 
we can write the expected value of buying a lottery ticket as: 
   1 * *1 2 2
1
1 1l
q
E V q u x p q u x
q
  
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And the value of not buying a ticket as: 
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This is approximately equal to: 
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The value of not buying a ticket is: 
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